

## Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-30

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DRAFTED BY:EUR/WE:CKJOHNSON

APPROVED BY:D-MR RUSH

EUR-MR STABLER

S/S-MR MILLER

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ROME

INFO NATO 0684

ALL NATO CAPITALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 215253

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (LINES MISSING END PARA 4)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IT

SUBJECT: GOI VIEWS ON US/EUROPEAN RELATIONS

1. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR ORTONA CALLED ON DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH OCTOBER 31 UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY TO CONVEY GOI VIEWS ON US EUROPEAN RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND ON IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. ORTONA HANDED OVER COPY OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS, TEXT OF WHICH IS TRANSMITTED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

2. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THE VIEWS SET FORTH IN THE PAPER, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS HELPFUL. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE HAVE BEEN VERY UPSET BY THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY SOME NATO AND NON-NATO COUNTRIES WHICH WAS MANIFESTED IN REFUSAL TO ALLOW OUR USE OF THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

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AIRSPACE OR REFUELING FACILITIES IN THE RE-SUPPLY OPERATION, REFUSAL TO AUTHORIZE SHIPMENT OF US EQUIPMENT FROM OUR BASES, AND LACK OF COOPERATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT SEEMED TO US THAT NATO WAS TAKING THE ATTI-

TUDE THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS A ONE-WAY STREET, WHEREAS THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WERE CLEARLY OF DIRECT CONCERN TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. THE FALL OF ISRAEL WOULD HAVE COMPLETELY CHANGED THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE AS WELL; IF WE HAD ALLOWED OUR ISRAELI ALLY TO BE OVERRUN, THE US

WOULD HAVE BEEN REGARDED BY ALL OF ITS ALLIES AS UNTRUSTWORTHY. ALL WE ASKED OF OUR NATO ALLIES WAS THAT THEY NOT IMPEDE THE SENDING OF OUR OWN EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL. BUT IT APPEARED THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PORTUGAL OUR ALLIES WERE DETERMINED TO SEPARATE THEMSELVES FROM US AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

3. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WENT ON TO SAY THAT DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS WE MAINTAINED OPEN COMMUNICATIONS WITH ALL PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AS WELL AS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IN ORDER TO PREVENT A WORSENING OF THE SITUATION. HE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE FEELING OF SOME IN NATO THAT WE DID NOT CONSULT WITH THEM AS MUCH AS WE SHOULD HAVE. UNFORTUNATELY EVENTS OFTEN MOVED SO QUICKLY THAT THERE WAS SIMPLY NO TIME FOR CONSULTATION. IN ANY EVENT THE NATO ALLIES SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WAS GRAVELY IMPORTANT TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, AND UNFORTUNATELY SOME DID NOT APPRECIATE THIS POINT.

4. REFERRING TO ITALY'S POSITION, AMBASSADOR ORTONA SAID THAT THE GOI HAD TRIED DISCREETLY TO DO WHAT IT COULD TO BE HELPFUL TO THE US. HE REFERRED TO ROME'S COMPLIANCE WITH AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S REQUEST FOR DEMARCHES IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND SAID THAT ITALY HAD TO SOME EXTENT COMPLIED WITH OUR REQUESTS WITH REGARD TO OVERFLIGHTS AND LANDING RIGHTS. FOREIGN MINISTER MORO HAD DELIVERED AN EVEN-HANDED STATEMENT OF GOI POLICY BEFORE PARLIAMENT, DESPITE THE PRESSURES OF PUBLIC OPINION, PARTICULARLY FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY. CONFIDENTIAL

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ORTONA SAID THAT HE FULLY AGREED THAT NATO MEMBERS SHOULD ACT LIKE ALLIES, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GOI HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ITS DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST OIL AND THE FACT THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN ITALY HAS TURNED AGAINST ISRAEL IN RECENT YEARS BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELIS' RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS. IN SUMMING UP THE ESSENTIALS OF ITALY'S POSITION ORTONA SAID THAT 1) THE GOI FELT THAT IT HAD DISCREETLY DONE WHAT IT COULD TO BE HELPFUL TO US, AND 2) THE GOI FEELS THAT THE MORE WE TALK PUBLICLY ABOUT DISSENSION IN NATO THE MORE WE PLAY INTO THE SOVIETS' HANDS. WITH REGARD TO IMPROVED CONSULTATION IN THE ALLIANCE, ORTONA REMARKED THAT PERHAPS WHAT IS REQUIRED NOW IS FOURTEEN HOT LINES. THE

DEPUTY SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION, BUT OBSERVED THAT CONSULTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY THE ANSWER TO EVERY PROBLEM. NO AMOUNT OF CONSULTATION, FOR INSTANCE, SEEMS TO DISPEL THE ERRONEOUS IDEA THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE HEADS OF OUR ALLIES.

ORTONA CONCLUDED BY UNDERLINING THE POINT IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH AFFIRMS THE IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE AND ACKNOWLEDGES THAT DETENTE MUST BE BASED ON A DIALOGUE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. KISSINGER

CONFIDENTIAL

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